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DOES EQUITY PASS THE LAUGH TEST?: A RESPONSE TO 
OLIAR AND SPRIGMAN 
Henry E. Smith*
OPYRIGHT law may not be the answer, but what is the question? 
Dotan Oliar and Christopher Sprigman explore an example of a 
norm system—the one among stand-up comedians against joke theft—
and show why it is likely superior to use of copyright to protect rights in 
jokes.1 In the course of their study they document both how formal 
copyright law is unsuited to protecting comedic material and what type 
of norm system, enforced by other comics and booking agents, has 
sprung up in its stead. From a property point of view, the likely bi-causal 
relationship between the development of the antiplagiarism norm and 
the rise of narrative, observational, and social commentary-style comedy 
out of earlier vaudeville and post-vaudeville styles is now, thanks to 
Oliar and Sprigman, one of the better documented cases of Demsetzian 
development we have.2 Oliar and Sprigman also argue that for all its 
dangers of mob justice and extreme simplicity, the norm system does 
protect investments in developing comedic material and is likely more 
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1 Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There's No Free Laugh (Anymore): The 
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 
Va. L. Rev. 1787 (2008). 
2 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347–48, 
350–58 (1967) (Papers & Proceedings); see also Symposium, The Evolution of Property 
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effective and desirable than an enhanced copyright law that might well 
crowd out the norms system. 
Oliar and Sprigman's article also poses a potential challenge to 
property theorists. Very interestingly, they show how the anti-joke-
stealing norm is far simpler than copyright law in that the norm does not 
allow for co-ownership of jokes and uses a first-to-publicize system. 
They argue that decentralized enforcement gives rise to this simplicity. 
The ease with which the simpler norm can be applied likely outweighs 
benefits from complications like divided ownership: if someone is using 
a bit that someone else used first, then he is a thief and subject to 
sanction. This is, on the face of it, somewhat unexpected in that usually 
norms can be more subtle and complex if they hold in a limited, close-
knit group with a lot of common knowledge.3 And indeed, other aspects 
of the anti-joke-stealing norm do look rather nuanced, such as standards 
of what is novel enough to be a routine, how much slack to give new, 
unknown comics, and, in working out a dispute, who “needs” a joke 
more. In these respects a lot of comedic expertise is required. Oliar and 
Sprigman's case study very usefully points to the need to distinguish 
which dimensions need to be standardized to save on third-party 
information costs and which do not.4 In the case of the stand-up comedy 
business, they note that the group is more “intermediate-knit” than 
close-knit, which probably allows for some mixture of personal 
knowledge and general common sense. But they rightly point out that 
the method of monitoring, especially in a decentralized peer-to-peer 
fashion in venues across the country, powerfully shapes the need for 
simplicity along certain dimensions like co-ownership.5 By unearthing 
this fascinating example of norms in a new type of community, Oliar 
and Sprigman have greatly enriched our understanding of the factors that 
push both toward and away from simplicity, and have provided another 
example of norms substituting for inadequate law—here copyright. 
But is copyright the only alternative to decentralized norms? In this 
Response, I will argue that Oliar and Sprigman's case for cautious 
endorsement of the norm system and lack of legal protection is 
impressive but incomplete. They may well be correct that the current 
system is the best, considering the alternatives, but they have not 
3 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 
Stan. L. Rev. 1105 (2003). 
4 Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 34 (2000) (noting that some less 
observable dimensions are more in need of standardization than others). 
5 Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 1, at 1864–65. 
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considered all the alternatives. In particular, the nature of the norms 
involved and the types of misappropriation they target suggest that some 
version of misappropriation law and unjust enrichment may be a 
candidate to add to the institutional mix of devices to deal with joke 
thieves. Although the dangers of an overexpansive law of 
misappropriation are well known and counsel caution in any extension 
into the sphere of stand-up comedy, a more equitable approach—as 
opposed to the formal law that Oliar and Sprigman take as their baseline 
and foil—may avoid some of the problems with copyright, mitigate 
some of the problems with the norm system itself, and do less damage to 
the systems of norms than would an extension of copyright. Finally, and 
in a more speculative vein, I will consider the possibility that the 
expansion of intellectual property law—which partly motivates Oliar 
and Sprigman to seek a nonlegal alternative—might in part be driven by 
a lack of any way station between formal in rem property rights on the 
one hand and community or occupational norms on the other. 
CUSTOM VERSUS COPYRIGHT 
At every turn, Oliar and Sprigman compare the system of norms with 
formal copyright law.6 In this they are well within the usual practice of 
the law and norms literature.7 It is certainly most striking when norms 
supplement, as here, or even contradict formal law, as they do among 
lobster gangs in Maine in delineating their territories, or among 
Chicagoans claiming shoveled parking spots on the Windy City's snowy 
streets. But the fascination with norms as an alternative to law has 
displaced an older question: when and how should law incorporate 
norms? Or in an older formulation: when is custom law? 
For custom to be enforceable as law—or in a more modern vein, to be 
adopted into the law—it must possess certain features. To take one oft-
cited formulation, Blackstone set out seven requirements for custom to 
have legal force: antiquity, continuity, peaceable use, certainty, 
reasonableness, compulsoriness (not by license), and consistency.8 It is 
instructive to look at the norms of stand-up comedy through this lens. 
6 See, e.g., Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 1, at 1794, 1799–1805, 1813, 1825, 1834–38, 
1840, 1858–59, 1866–67. 
7 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 
(1991). 
8 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *76–79.
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Antiquity could be a problem for the norms of comedy: certainly they do 
not date back to 1189 or even for a very long time in the United States. 
They may, however, date to the beginning of the current era in stand-up 
comedy (that is, the era following Oliar and Sprigman's “post-
vaudeville”), and the norms have probably been around long enough to 
know they are here to stay and are serving a purpose. Continuity and 
peaceable use both seem to be satisfied, notwithstanding the occasional 
fracas like that between Joe Rogan and Carlos Mencia, which are really 
examples of enforcement actions. Comics feel compelled to follow the 
norm, as Oliar and Sprigman amply document. As for reasonableness, 
Oliar and Sprigman have made a strong case that the norm serves the 
purpose of fostering creativity in stand-up comedy by protecting 
investments in developing material. Whether the norm is consistent with 
the law in general turns on questions of preemption and possible conflict 
with copyright—issues to which I return in a moment. Blackstone's 
remaining requirement is certainty. 
As I have argued elsewhere, part of the certainty requirement involves 
communication of the norm to the relevant duty holders.9 Customs can 
be vague, and this problem only worsens when a custom might be 
enforced outside its community of origin: what makes a spot subject to 
exclusive rights to work may be obvious to fellow miners in a given area 
but not so obvious to outsiders or to courts. Something very similar is 
going on here with the comics' norms. Oliar and Sprigman express 
concern that the norm against joke theft is too vague and might chill 
behavior.10 The norm certainly approaches the outer reaches of 
copyright near the idea/expression dichotomy, the importance of which 
in copyright law reflects similar worries. But we would need more 
empirical evidence to determine whether the norm is all that vague to the 
participants themselves. To take an example closer to home, academics 
probably have a clearer sense for what is plagiarism than others do, even 
though it might be a little hard to articulate to a nonexpert. 
So whether the norm of stand-up comedy is appropriate for 
incorporation into the law is really an open question, subject to further 
empirical work. Militating in favor of limited enforcement is that the 
norm itself arose in an intermediate-knit group in which the amount of 
background knowledge is less than among a smaller, more close-knit 
group. Consistent with this character of the community, the norm itself 
9 Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 Theoretical Inquiries L. 6 
(2009). 
10 Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 1, at 1837. 
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is somewhat formal. The authors rightly point out that the norm shows a 
strong numerus clausus-like standardization and simplicity,11 with a 
view towards ease of enforcement: if a joke cannot be co-owned and two 
people are using it, one of them is a thief. Simple priority rules interact 
with a more complicated social sense of working things out and getting 
along. There is a danger of enforcing the surrounding relationship-
preserving norms in litigation, where relations have broken down. But it 
is the simplicity in the delineation of the entitlement itself that makes it 
even a candidate for some kind of enforcement. 
THE MISAPPROPRIATION ALTERNATIVE 
Another reason that custom is not as welcome at the table as it once 
was is that the customs that reflected commercial morality mainly have 
entered the law (or equity) through doctrines of misappropriation and 
unjust enrichment. These areas of the law are both underappreciated and 
regarded with suspicion these days. For one thing, the seeming danger of 
using misappropriation to deal with the appropriation of ideas makes 
people nervous because of its potential for overexpansion. In this Part, I 
call this reflexive distaste into question and even suggest that 
overreaction against it may have contributed to the overexpansiveness of 
the formal intellectual property rights that Oliar and Sprigman take as 
the main alternative to the norms of stand-up comics. 
The cautionary tale here conventionally starts with International 
News Service v. Associated Press,12 in which the Supreme Court held 
that the use of a competing news service's stories in one's own news 
service and newspapers is a misappropriation enjoinable by a court of 
equity. Aware of the criticism that it might be creating a property right 
in news, the Court declared the protected interest to be quasi-property 
rather than an in rem right. In his famous dissent, Justice Brandeis 
criticized the majority for doing precisely what it claimed not to be 
doing—creating new property rights—in an area in which legislatures 
are better judges of the situation. Perhaps more importantly for present 
IP debates, Justice Brandeis also made a strong case for a presumption 
that information exists in the public domain, such that where the limited 
IP protections provided by Congress (and to a lesser extent state law) do 
11 Merrill & Smith, supra note 4. 
12 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
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not apply, information is “free as the air to common use.”13 Brandeis' 
dissent has been taken as a clarion call for IP skeptics ever since.14
Although unfair competition is treated as an adjunct to trademark law 
these days, at other times and in other legal systems it has been closely 
associated with unjust enrichment.15 Some commentators have also seen 
an implicit theme of unjust enrichment in intellectual property law 
itself.16 The problem becomes how to prevent this theory from 
becoming too broad, both in order to protect the public domain and to 
avoid preemption by copyright or patent law.17 Although the doctrine of 
misappropriation can be viewed as preventing a competitor from reaping 
where he has not sown, there needs to be a limit to this principle.18 Such 
concerns apply to unjust enrichment more broadly, so that although one 
can speak in general terms of how one who is unjustly enriched at 
another's expense is liable in restitution,19 the problem lies in defining 
what enrichment is unjust. Some see unjust enrichment as a substantive 
and expansive concept, while others see it as merely an organizing 
principle for thinking about liability, the main sources of which come 
from other branches of law.20
Misappropriation also connects with custom. Richard Epstein has 
argued that because news organizations had a norm of respecting hot 
news and would only use it as a tip for independent investigation, the 
result in International News Service is correct for being in accord with 
custom.21 Whether Epstein's conclusion follows turns in part on the 
informational demands that the custom makes in light of the set of duty 
13 Id. at 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Cheney Brothers v. Doris Silk 
Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929) (Hand, J.). 
14 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment 
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999). 
15 See, e.g., Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment 3 (2d ed. 2005); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, 
Rethinking Copyright: Property Through the Lenses of Unjust Enrichment and Unfair 
Competition, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 345 (2008). 
16 See Balganesh, supra note 15; Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual 
Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 Va. L. Rev. 149 (1992). 
17 See, e.g., Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). 
18 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of 
International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 411, 413 (1983) (noting 
that there is no principle allowing one to reap wherever one has sown, and in particular not 
on land one does not own). 
19 Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 1 (Discussion Draft 2000); 
see also Restatement of Restitution § 1 (1937).
20 See, e.g., Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust 
Enrichment, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 2083 (2001). 
21 Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and Law as 
Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 Va. L. Rev. 85, 101–02 (1992).
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holders. Limiting the duty holders to direct competitors helps. If 
anything, the custom among stand-up comics is less vague than the one 
in International News Service governing “hot news.” The anti-joke-
stealing norm does not require defining what is hot (or what is funny, for 
that matter). But it is much more expansive, because it has no time limit 
at all, although some temporal limitation might appropriately be grafted 
onto a misappropriation claim, whether under the doctrine of laches or 
otherwise. 
My purpose here is not to argue for extending International News 
Service to jokes. Indeed, Oliar and Sprigman advert to some of the 
problems such an approach could present. One, just noted, is that the 
custom may be too expansive, and this is always a concern with 
incorporating industry customs into IP law.22 Too expansive use of 
custom, particularly as the set of duty holders grows, would pose large 
information costs and subvert the numerus clausus.23 Would such a 
misappropriation claim in the realm of stand-up comedy derogate from 
the public domain more or less than copyright? The set of duty holders 
is far smaller than in copyright, which is in rem. Would 
misappropriation threaten to displace the existing norm and its informal 
enforcement mechanism as much as copyright would? It is hard to say, 
but unlike copyright, a misappropriation regime would dovetail 
substantively with the comedians' norm because a large amount of the 
content of the misappropriation regime would derive from the norm 
itself. Would use of equity-style judicially-managed misappropriation 
law invite less rent seeking than would industry-specific statutory IP 
regimes, which Oliar and Sprigman rightly view as rife with rent-
seeking possibilities?24 Finally, would use of the norm in the law make 
it less certain than would informal enforcement or arbitration within the 
stand-up world? The fact that, at least in contractual disputes, parties in 
the same business often prefer what appear to the outsider as formal 
bright line rules should give us pause.25 But although Oliar and 
Sprigman very convincingly argue that the norm system is probably 
22 See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual 
Property, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1899 (2007). 
23 Smith, supra note 9, at 35–36. 
24 See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 1, at 1840. 
25 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001); Lisa 
Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent 
Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765 (1996). 
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better than any version of formal copyright, they leave unaddressed the 
question whether the norm should be supplemented with an equity-style 
misappropriation theory based on unjust enrichment. 
The larger question here is whether an ex post equity-style standard 
based on morality and existing norms would be better or worse than 
formal law and norms alone. This is a difficult question in general but 
might be easier to assess in a given business like stand-up comedy. At 
the very least, misappropriation and the law of equity do pass the laugh 
test. 
LAW AND EQUITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Finally, we might entertain a hypothesis about the nature of law and 
equity in intellectual property. What if our fears of equity and the 
“Chancellor's foot”26 and of expansive readings of International News 
Service—which was itself an equity case—have led to the kind of 
overexpansiveness in the formal law of IP that troubles Oliar and 
Sprigman (and many others)? There has always been a suspicion of 
equity and the need to keep it cabined (for example, only acting in 
personam, and only when the legal remedy is inadequate and not in 
derogation of property rights) but after the fusion of law and equity, our 
view of formalism versus context-based discretion has become 
polarized. Some want to banish judicial discretion and others want 
contextualized decisionmaking to be available at all times. 
In IP there has been, in reaction to International News Service, a 
tendency to use formal IP law where once misappropriation might have 
served. Might some of the impetus for business method patents and 
expansive uses of copyright have been somewhat dulled if the most 
egregious problems of freeriding in violation of existing industry custom 
could have been addressed through suits for misappropriation and unjust 
enrichment? Again, it is hard to say because it has hardly been tried. The 
dangers inherent in International News Service should not rule out 
misappropriation as a safety valve that might prevent even worse 
approaches. It is a testament to the richness of their study of stand-up 
26 See John Selden, Equity, in Table-Talk: Being the Discourses of John Selden, Esq. 43, 
43–44 (London, J.M. Dent & Co. 2d ed. 1689) available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=9QtKAAAAIAAJ&hl=en (“Equity is a Roguish thing: 
for law we have a measure, know what to trust to; Equity is according to the Conscience of 
him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity. 'Tis all one as if they 
should make the Standard for the measure we call a Foot, a Chancellor's Foot; what an 
uncertain Measure would be this. One Chancellor has a long Foot, another a short Foot, a 
Third an indifferent Foot: 'Tis the same thing in the Chancellor's Conscience.”). 
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comedy that Oliar and Sprigman cast these long-buried issues in such 
sharp relief. 
 
